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Abstract
Various reflections on the ‘Arab Spring’ evince a common view of the relationship between change and time 
that imbues events with a sense of intrinsic peril. Based on a framework developed from Norbert Elias’s 
concept of timing, this article elaborates the relationship between time and the ‘Arab Spring’ by unpacking 
and explaining three rhetorical tropes prevalent in academic responses to the revolts. The first two 
construct a problem to which the third proffers a solution. First, analysts treat time itself as a problematic 
force confounding stability and progress. Second, they deploy fluvial metaphors to present dynamic events 
as inherently insecure. Third, they use temporal Othering to retrofit the ‘Arab Spring’ to the familiar arc of 
liberal democracy, which renders the revolts intelligible and amenable to external intervention. These moves 
prioritize certainty and order over other considerations and constrain open-ended transformations within 
a familiar rubric of political progress. They also constitute an active timing effort based on a conservative 
standard, with important implications for our understanding of security and for scholarly reflexivity. The 
article concludes with three temporal alternatives for engaging novel changes like the ‘Arab Spring’.
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Introduction
After unprecedented changes, scholars often grapple with questions about how they happened, 
what they mean, and their future implications. After the ‘Arab Spring’, such responses expressed 
prominent themes. Initially, the revolutions shocked analysts1 but were also lauded for deposing 
longstanding autocrats. However, many assessments also expressed concerns about insecurity. 
This anxiety surfaced openly in discussions about instability, terrorism, or state failure, but it also 
worked more subtly through recurrent tropes interpreting the ‘Arab Spring’ as a new and uncertain 
time; a highly fluid situation; or the belated arrival of progress in heretofore-backward locales. 
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These tropes provided a rhetorical common sense of the transformations, making them seem like 
mere discursive relics of little substantive import. However, much more than idiomatic asides or 
stylistic flourishes, these symbols constitute a common temporality – a particular, shared relation-
ship to time that enables and constrains thinking about the ‘Arab Spring’: problematic figurations 
of time tinge references to a new era with elements of danger, fluvial metaphors apprehend unprec-
edented changes as perilous, and temporal Othering renders ambiguous processes intelligible, 
manageable, and ultimately securable under the rubric of democratization. We can understand this 
common temporality using Norbert Elias’s idea of timing, which explains such temporal tropes, 
demonstrates their influence on thinking about the ‘Arab Spring’, and shows how the necessities 
of theorizing constrain a variety of assessments within liberal-democratic limits.
While the ‘Arab Spring’ is not the first instance of Western referents governing the analysis of 
global politics (see e.g. Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004), there is much we can gain from unpacking 
it. Precisely because Western frames are so pervasive it is necessary to call out their influence in 
each new instance, especially during pivotal transformations. Additionally, the ‘Arab Spring’ high-
lights three neglected puzzles about the relationship between social science and time. First, why 
are temporal symbols so prevalent after surprising changes? Second, why do these symbols have 
a principally malign inclination? Third, what are their connections to the dominant, liberal-
democratic frame – how does the particular temporality assigned to the ‘Arab Spring’ inflect efforts 
to understand and manage it? To address these issues, I introduce a novel theoretical framework 
showing how temporal tropes prefigure important explanatory and normative choices. Although 
purportedly describing time per se, tropes actually indicate attempts at timing events in a way that 
renders them more intelligible and secure. In addition to clarifying temporal symbols, this explana-
tion raises intriguing issues for scholarly practice. The first two tropes – the problem of time and 
fluvial metaphors – construct a problem to which the third – temporal Othering – proffers a ready 
solution, reinforcing conservative theorizing and the hegemony of the Western political imagina-
tion. So in addition to using the ‘Arab Spring’ to develop a different understanding of time via 
timing, I thereby add an explicitly temporalized element missing from other critiques of the ‘Arab 
Spring’. These have focused on its innovative sexual politics (Agathangelou, 2011), its ironic roots 
in ‘neoliberal governmentality’ (Tagma et al., 2013), its gender-based insecurities (Johansson-
Nogués, 2013) and its regional particularity (Grovogui, 2013). But while they complement certain 
points developed below, none foreground time or timing. This is somewhat curious given the per-
vasiveness of temporal descriptors in ‘Arab Spring’ discussions.
To draw out time and timing, I zoom in on the academic aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’, when 
scholars were formulating initial responses to novel changes. By ‘academic aftermath’ I mean 
monographs published between 2011 and 2013 and shorter pieces published between 2011 and 
2012, including those either penned by academics or appearing in academic outlets.2 I focus on a 
variety of analyses in mainstream international studies, neopositivist social science, area studies, 
and critical and cultural theory. This diversity is intentional – rather than a particular, closed dis-
course, I identify three conspicuous temporal threads running through a range of responses and use 
timing to show how they are interrelated in a pervasive and influential rhetorical framework that 
casts the ‘Arab Spring’ as a novel problem with security implications. Because this early ‘Arab 
Spring’ scholarship comprises my empirical and critical object rather than a set of interlocutors, I 
position the analysis relative to works on time and international politics.3
These choices clarify the academic aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a matter of timing but they 
also entail trade-offs. I do not provide a comprehensive view of the literature, omitting social 
movement, contentious politics, and autocratic stability research. Such literatures, which highlight 
differences in the ‘Arab Spring’ between violent and nonviolent protests, different forms of repre-
sentative politics (Della Porta, 2013), and monarchic-versus republican–autocratic revolutionary 
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contexts (Yom and Gause, 2012), admittedly overlap with the responses scrutinized here.4 However, 
in our chronological window they do not emphasize security and temporality as clearly – although 
subsequent inquiry might uncover their timing and security implications. Relatedly, it would be 
interesting to examine more recent ‘Arab Spring’ analyses of newer developments: As scholars’ 
initial surprise wanes, does time seem less malicious? Or do prolonged contestation and/or further 
shocks (e.g. the Benghazi embassy attack in 2012) reaffirm time as a problem? Have authoritarian 
reversals reduced the prevalence of fluvial metaphors or have protracted crises (e.g. Syria) perpetuated 
the image of insecurity spilling over state borders? How does the mixed record of revolutionary 
outcomes impact temporal Othering? Clearly, much further work is possible, and the current 
discussion hopes to provoke interest along these lines.
The argument unfolds over six sections. The first discusses cognate works on time and security, 
which provide useful insights but do not consider timing or the tropes found in the ‘Arab Spring’. 
The second develops Elias’s concept of timing, paying special attention to its holistic power, its 
active and passive modes, and its implications for novel change. The next three sections use this 
timing framework to understand three temporal tropes of the ‘Arab Spring’. The problem of time 
and fluvial metaphors indicate that surprising developments threw off working models of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), engendering anxiety and attempts to render events 
more familiar and manageable. A predominant example of this is temporal Othering, which uses 
the standard of Western democracy to imbue the ‘Arab Spring’ with intelligibility, order, and a 
predictable future. Temporal Othering also shows how efforts to manage novelty may severely 
constrain our imagination about politics and security. The conclusion reflects on the implications 
of the ‘Arab Spring’ for time, timing, and security as well as for scholarly reflexivity and poses 
three alternative temporalities for grappling with surprising events.
Time, international politics, and security
The relationship among time, international politics, and security has already received some atten-
tion in critical scholarship. James der Derian (1995: 34) argues that the search for security repre-
sents a ‘fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown’ based on the premise that a ‘safe life 
requires safe truths’. Similarly, J Peter Burgess (2012: 711–712) examines how the modern epis-
teme treats affronts to ‘the certainty of knowledge’ as ‘metathreats’ against ‘the stability of authen-
tic reality’ auguring existential danger. Michael Dillon (2008: 313) underscores the temporal 
implications of this orientation: ‘Tame the future and you may, finally, secure a [human being] 
whose very existence is temporal.’ Having denied the possibility of spiritual transcendence, mod-
ern humanity is ‘doomed to time’, rendering security ‘eschatological’ inasmuch as the ‘catastrophic 
threat of the dissolution of the [extant] order’ establishes a ‘katechontic’ or restraining interest in 
stability as such (Dillon, 2011: 781–782, 784). Although less concerned with time, Christopher 
Daase and Oliver Kessler’s typology of danger bears closely on these concerns. Threat refers to 
known knowns, a ‘realm of available secured knowledge’ and ‘recursive patterns’ (Daase and 
Kessler, 2007: 415). Risk describes known unknowns by delineating uncertainty via probabilistic 
trend calculations (p. 424). Disaster characterizes unknown unknowns, when there is ‘no measure 
to tame uncertainty’ or ‘sudden qualitative change’ (p. 427). Although it fades in and out of these 
discussions, time is never far from their reflections on modern security logics, which consistently 
associate certitude and delimited futures with protection, on the one hand, and uncertainty, novelty, 
and open futures with peril, on the other.
These issues resonate in RBJ Walker’s (1993: 106) seminal discussion of how modern sover-
eignty treats ‘stasis and change, being and becoming, or structure and history as mutually exclusive 
oppositions’. To overcome the vicissitudes of temporal existence, we must first fix an order in 
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space, usually in the form of a territorial state enabling unilinear progress by exporting cycles of 
violence beyond its borders (Walker, 1993: 62–63). Relatedly, Kimberly Hutchings (2008) uncov-
ers variations of unified political time subordinating multiplicity and political possibility in 
accounts of world politics. Political time arises from different combinations of two primary temporali-
ties: chronos, understood as homogeneous, predictable and deterministic flow; and kairos, a moment 
of opportunity for transformative action (Hutchings, 2008: 5–8, 30–34). In theories, these combi-
nations produce a single, determinate vision of how political time unfolds and what can be accom-
plished by intervening in it. Buttressed by invocations of privileged scientific knowledge, such 
visions effectively deny the ‘heterotemporality’ of world politics (Hutchings, 2008: 154–177).
These works highlight important temporal considerations relevant to the academic aftermath of 
the ‘Arab Spring’, where commentators draw distinctly modern links between surprise, uncertainty, 
and peril, and manifest an eschatological approach to security that treats instability as intrinsically 
dangerous. They also work to transform the unknown unknowns of the ‘Arab Spring’ into risks or 
threats, often by subsuming them under a single, closed account of political progress authorized by 
privileged knowledge. In this way, academic responses ‘tame the future’ in order to secure a chang-
ing present.5
However, the literature on time and international politics remains incomplete for our purposes 
in three respects. First, it does not treat any of the specific temporal tropes running through the 
‘Arab Spring’ – the problem of time,6 fluvial metaphors, and temporal Othering – and as such can-
not delineate their implications for understanding security. Second, partly because of this gap and 
partly because most works do not elaborate the internal links between temporal assumptions and 
theoretical outcomes (although see Hutchings, 2008), it cannot address how our tropes inflect 
analyses. Third, it does not provide a synoptic framework for connecting various temporalities to 
political phenomena. Scholars have criticized particular temporalities (e.g. linear versus cyclical; 
see Walker, 1993) or forwarded poly-temporal arguments for purposes of political critique (e.g. 
Hutchings, 2008), but have not sought to systematically comprehend the many temporalities of 
international life. Taken together, these issues leave us insufficiently prepared to explain why par-
ticular temporalities emerge in the ‘Arab Spring’, how they impact scholarly responses, and their 
implications for politics and security.
From time to timing and back
Norbert Elias’s theory of timing is especially apt for comprehending time in a way that foregrounds 
these issues.7 With some elaboration, his account allows us to unpack and understand the problem 
of time, fluvial metaphors, and temporal Othering. Timing thereby helps explicate time in the ‘Arab 
Spring’, which in turn illustrates what happens when timing breaks down, how scholars respond to 
such a situation and how security assessments depend on events being well timed.8 As will become 
clear, Elias overlaps with several points just discussed but advances them further toward an over-
arching explanation.
Elias (2007: 38–39, 61) contends that the objective noun ‘time’ and related temporal images 
emerge in language to symbolize various features of a dynamic and practical timing activity, a crea-
tive synthesis of two or more continua of change where one continuum acts as the timing standard 
for the others.9 Change continua can be natural cycles, physical motion, or any variations we can 
relate (p. 110). We engage in timing by using the chosen standard to integrate and coordinate them 
so that the ‘when-aspects’ of the resulting synthesis produce a well-ordered sequence conducive to 
our purposes (pp. 43–44, 85). Timing thus works by comprehending otherwise discordant changes 
in an intelligible and useful way. When we have timed them successfully, we understand their 
relations and import and can decide how and when to act upon them. Thus, a ‘good sense of timing’ 
not only indicates a kairotic sense of when to act decisively (Hutchings, 2008), but also that we 
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occupy an intelligible realm in which to do so, as in chronos.10 Likewise, a breakdown in timing or 
‘bad sense of timing’ vitiates our capacity for effective intervention but also destabilizes our 
broader sense that things hang together in an orderly, secure fashion.
Timing can be active or passive (Elias, 2007: 41–43). Active timing requires effortful reflection 
and explicit decisions about which changes matter, how to relate them, and by what standard. It can 
arise because an entirely novel event occurs or when extant modes become inadequate owing to 
unintended effects or proliferating complexity. By contrast, passive timing requires no decision 
and so little effort that it proceeds almost subconsciously. It results when change continua are easy 
to synthesize or once active timing has, through success and repetition, become ‘second nature’. It 
is important to note that active and passive are not fixed attributes – timing is always an ongoing, 
practical activity. An active timing project becomes passive as it repeatedly succeeds; a previously 
passive timing mode becomes active whenever it falters. The tension in this dynamic elaborates 
several ideas introduced in the time literature, for it is precisely surprising change that introduces 
uncertainty and the unknown or instability, all of which throw off passive timing, confound active 
timing, and often herald insecurity.
When passive timing becomes inadequate, three options are available. Novel events can be 
retrofitted to extant modes of synthesis, used to revise them, or taken as an opportunity for imagin-
ing new alternatives. These options trace a spectrum of increasing difficulty: retrofitting requires 
some interpretive effort to index developments to an existing model; revision significantly alters 
that model but also remains delimited by it; genuine alternatives reconsider everything and entail 
fundamental questions about understanding and being in the world. This spectrum also tracks from 
passive to increasingly active timing: retrofitting marks the move from passive to minimally active 
effort; revision is more active; new alternatives require new timing standards, different modes of 
combination, and may confront a genuine timing crisis – the possibility that no timing standards or 
modes are adequate to a developing situation (see Table 1). Finally, this spectrum tracks from a 
mostly assured sense of security, stability, and order to a threshold of radical doubt about all three.
Whether active or passive, difficult or easy, the more we engage in timing, the more we describe 
it with a symbolic language whose figural qualities encourage us to think and speak ‘in terms of 
reifying substantives’ and ‘static conditions’ rather than active processes or dynamic relations 
(Elias, 2007: 43) – that is, to talk about ‘time’ rather than ‘timing’. Through linguistic reification, 
experiences with timing inform objectified, substantive ‘time’ utterances, which are therefore best 
understood as timing indexicals describing ongoing timing activities and signaling those activities’ 
in/effectiveness. So, whenever we encounter temporal artefacts in language, we should ask what 
timing efforts are behind them and take their positive or negative imagery as indicative of how 
well such efforts are going. Negative temporal references indicate that timing requires increas-
ingly active effort verging on failure and catastrophe – troubling ‘times’ point to a troubled or bad 
‘sense of timing’. Positive or neutral evocations indicate a good and perhaps passive sense of 
Table I. Timing responses to novelty, temporal references, and security.
Timing mode 
sufficient to 
pertinent events
Retrofit novel 
event to extant 
timing mode
Revise extant timing 
mode owing to 
novel event
Devise new 
alternative from 
novel event
Novel event 
persistently strange/ 
incomprehensible
Passive timing         Increasingly active timing →         Timing breakdown
              Increasing degree of difficulty →
        Increasing prevalence of problem of time and fluvial metaphors →
        Security/stability/order  →  Insecurity/instability/disorder
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timing. Combined with the active/passive distinction, treating temporal tropes and utterances as 
timing indexicals also addresses the second and third issues identified in the time and security 
literature. In Elias, all temporal references refer to dynamic timing activities, which can be 
unpacked by focusing on their modes of relation and standard of synthesis. Furthermore, the 
status of timing activities is implicit in the temporal references themselves.
In addition to addressing several themes from the works already covered, Eliasian timing pro-
vides a synoptic framework for interpreting time. It not only accommodates multiple and diverse 
temporal references, but connects them to the substantive outcomes that timing produces and 
explains why we tend to conflate safety with certainty – we feel safer in well-timed environments 
– and to treat affronts to stable knowledge with eschatological unease – uncertainty confounds 
timing and thereby attaches danger and insecurity to time itself. Elias thus shifts focus from time 
to timing, but in a way that also makes sense of time. A prevalence of ‘time’ utterances or tempo-
ral tropes in language like that found in the academic aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ marks an 
opportunity to discover prevalent modes and standards of timing and to assess their effectiveness 
with regard to ongoing changes. As we will see, this question of effective timing also holds 
express implications for security. The next two sections track threatening figurations of time and 
abstract yet dangerous symbols of temporal fluidity in early ‘Arab Spring’ responses. These refer-
ences disclose active challenges in timing the MENA region, which make the continued passage 
of time seem naturally dangerous. They also impel efforts to restore a good sense of timing and 
thereby some semblance of order and security. The third section shows how temporal Othering 
accomplishes this.
The problem of time
The ‘Arab Spring’ produced surprise and uncertainty coupled with generalized anxiety about secu-
rity (see e.g. Anderson, 2011: 3). An important assumption about time undergirds such responses, 
namely, that it is an agent or force naturally opposed to human affairs. I call this the problem of time 
because it understands uncertainty, instability, and insecurity as features intrinsic to time itself. This 
flows from ancient figurations of time as a capricious god whose dominion over human affairs 
brought only decay, danger and death (see Brandon, 1965: 31–64). Such images influenced Greek 
and Judeo-Christian systems, which both identified mutability with imperfection and contrasted it 
to the ideal of eternity and its earthly counterpart: stability (see Brandon, 1965: 106–205; Gunnell, 
1987). These factors imbued Western thought with the idea that things that are temporal or ‘in time’ 
are vulnerable to negative change – they pass as time passes and eventually they pass away.
By and large, change and dynamism are still subordinate to eternity and stability, while time 
itself is presumed to run counter to positive possibilities (Smith, 2008: 53). Despite the modern 
development of standardized clocks and their image of time as a homogeneous and neutral dimen-
sion, we still have recourse to the problem of time. When invoked, the problem of time signals that 
time’s passage brings change and danger unless some human elements – for example, democracy, 
sturdy institutions, or security apparatuses – check its disposition toward dissolution (see Der 
Derian, 1995: 30). In this way, the problem of time further signals challenges with extant timing.
Initial academic responses to the ‘Arab Spring’ evoked the problem of time. In remarks about 
uncertainty, chaos, and unpredictability, they apprehended extraordinary political events as intrin-
sically insecure and dangerous. Though the end of autocracy is welcome, if ‘political uncertainty 
hangs in the air’ then such changes remain fraught with peril for analysts and actors alike (Wilner, 
2011: 50). This is because uncertainty augurs a limited spectrum of possibilities – at best a 
difficult return to stability, at worst volatility (Cook and Stathis, 2012: 184; Mabrouk, 2011: 
144), instability and chaos (Lynch, 2013: 189), disruptions and continuing violence (Sorenson, 
2011: 44; Miller et al., 2012: 15; Zgurić, 2012: 418–19), or further unknowns harkening some 
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combination of the rest (Bamyeh, 2012: 37; cf. Burgess, 2012: 699–700). Such a narrow range 
orients us toward possibilities such as a negative ‘Arab Winter’ (Wiarda, 2012) following the 
‘spring’, authoritarian reversals (Wilner, 2011: 56) or the rise of terrorism, which (unlike institu-
tionalized government) finds ‘new opportunit[ies]’ in ‘political upheaval’ (Wilner, 2011: 60; see 
also Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 2012: 839, 841; Magen, 2012: 10). These problematic assump-
tions tinge seemingly value-neutral observations like ‘parts of the Arab world are in transition, 
leaving important questions about the future’ (Sorenson, 2011: 25; see also Walt, 2011a) with the 
sense that change and uncertainty signal ‘times’ of ‘turbulence’ on the near horizon (Kneissl, 
2011: 16) or ‘a mix of hope, sadness, and foreboding for the future’ (Sorenson, 2011: 22).
Absent reliable ordering mechanisms and sources of stability, these temporal tropes cast the 
‘Arab Spring’ as intrinsically dangerous. They also recall Dillon’s (2011: 784) katechontic secu-
rity, in which we view any stability as preferable to disorder. In this way of thinking, positive 
changes are suspect unless they guarantee a ‘predictable, efficient and measurable’ transition to 
even more secure outcomes (see Tagma et al., 2013: 386). Without such safeguards, uncertainty 
about the continued flow of events portends only a chaos diametrically opposed to political pro-
gress (see Wiarda, 2012: 137). There are any number of references to the ‘Arab Spring’ as a ‘his-
torical’ moment, which often indicates its momentousness. But this also hints that the future itself 
is in doubt, which almost automatically opens the door to the unknown along with chaos and 
violence (Haseeb, 2012: 189). These temporal tropes illustrate Elias’s relationship between ‘time’ 
references and timing activities. Their combined negative weight suggests no one expected the 
changes of 2011, which refuted working models of the region; as a result of both surprise and 
refutation, scholars came to speak about the flow of time as naturally malign. This breakdown in 
timing manifested through comments raising a time of insecurity as the spectre at the feast of 
Arab revolutions.
Flood myths
In addition to the problem of time, fluvial metaphors highlight scholars’ struggles to incorporate 
discordant changes in extant modes of timing. It is commonplace to say time ‘flows’ like a river 
and to note that both destabilize everything in their path (see Newton-Smith, 1980: 4–5). The bond 
between fluidity and danger traces back to ancient flood myths, in which a deluge destroys all life 
on earth (see Dundes, 1988). Such stories are prevalent in most traditions, and prominent thinkers 
have long identified fluidity with chaos and danger (see Gunnell, 1987; Walker, 1993). Although 
the flood myth has receded somewhat in contemporary discourses, its suggestive links among 
fluidity, temporality, and insecurity persist. References to ‘fluid situations’, the ‘flow of events’ or 
a ‘flood of’ action indicate dynamic phenomena, but also signal unruliness and peril. In responses 
to the ‘Arab Spring’, metaphors like wave, flood, surge, spill, fluid, and flux describe not only 
surprise at vigorous changes, but also a more normatively weighted sense of insecurity.
Waves
Many scholars identify the ‘Arab Spring’ as the ‘fourth wave’ of democratization (e.g. Joshi, 2011: 
64; Magen, 2012: 10–13). Such ‘waves’ depend on collective engagement and thus seem a positive 
development. Other seemingly impartial metaphorical deployments include references to ‘waves’ 
of ‘revolution’ or ‘revolutionary change’ (Haseeb, 2011: 113; Walt, 2011b; see also Butler and 
Khoury, 2013: 76)11 or ‘protests’ (Chaney, 2012: 391; Haseeb, 2012: 190).
Yet wave metaphors also evoke surprise and insecurity. Rather than predictive recurrence, ‘wave’ 
signals uneasy arrivals, as in the ‘sudden wave’ of uprisings (Haseeb, 2011: 113–114) emerging from 
wild locales like the ‘Arab street’12 that are naturally incapable of clean, ‘linear transitions’ from 
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autocracy to democracy (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 135). Such ‘waves’ are distinctly unmanageable. 
Without some decisive intervention, they threaten to sweep away not only despots but also wider 
political arrangements (Kamrava, 2012) and even ‘tranquility’ per se (Walt, 2011c). Nor are they 
mere surface perturbations – rather, they are ‘wide and deep’ (Lynch, 2013: 14) and therefore unfath-
omable and uncontrollable (Sakbani, 2011: 141). Additionally, they might be followed by more dan-
gerous breakers, including regime repression, refugee flows (Lynch, 2013: 189; Saideman, 2012: 
714) or Islamist takeovers (Chaney, 2012: 363, 394). After all, the problem with deep waters is that 
just when they seem safe, something unsafe may be lurking below.13
Surge, flood, spill
Similarly, ‘surge’ denotes surprise and speed, as when the unexpected act of one street vendor initiated 
a ‘sudden surge of protest’ in two previously stable autocracies (Schneider, 2011: 481). As with 
waves, humans provide the constitutive material – ‘the popular upsurge of 2011’ – yet this also 
suggests disorderly ‘surging masses of people’ (Weyland, 2012: 923). It also shares metaphorical 
space with insurgents, those violent exemplars of political disorder.14 Although this may appear a 
rhetorical accident, popular upsurges and ‘Islamist surges’ (Zgurić, 2012: 417) both signal the idea 
that unpredictable action in the absence of political constraints holds dangerous potential.
‘Flood’ describes a previously stable, passive body turned disruptive. For example, the ‘Arab 
Spring’ was an ‘emotional flood that had nowhere to channel its expression’ (Mabrouk, 2011: 143) 
and so breached standing ‘floodgates’ (Weyland, 2012: 917) or several ‘dams at the same time’ (in 
Butler and Khoury, 2013: 74). Once again, humans are hydro-molecular: ‘tens of thousands of 
young Egyptians flooded Tahrir Square, spilling out onto Cairo’s streets’ (Schneider, 2011: 481; 
see also Sorenson, 2011: 24). As such, they are potentially dangerous by virtue of sheer numbers, 
but also because these particular political particles are ‘spontaneous, leaderless’, ‘amorphous’ 
(Weyland, 2012: 924), ‘emotional’ and conflicted (in Goodwin, 2011: 453), and therefore more 
likely to choose violent or unwelcome alternatives. Furthermore, they are unused ‘to the idea of not 
having a dictator to tell them what to do’ (in Butler and Khoury, 2013: 74, emphasis added) and 
may cause others to falsify their preferences, making accurate data collection and prediction 
impossible (see Goodwin, 2011: 453–454).15 Whether because scholars cannot get traction on them 
or because they are naturally dangerous, such ‘floods’ pose a security problem even as they 
inaugurate political change.
When waters ‘spill over’, they menace surrounding areas. ‘Spill’ invokes surprise and uncer-
tainty, but also disorder, insecurity and crisis (Sawani, 2012: 392; Zgurić, 2012: 418; Lynch, 2013: 
123, 166) – all close companions of the problem of time. At their limit, such ‘dire spill-over effects’ 
portend an even more troubling ‘cascade of failures across the region’ (Magen, 2012: 18). Spill-
over also overwhelms geographic distance thanks to contemporary information technologies, as 
when China blocked web searches for ‘jasmine’ to ‘avert any potential spill-over of the virus of the 
Jasmine revolution’ from Tunisia (Kneissl, 2011: 1). The combination of fluvial and contagion 
metaphors here is noteworthy because although scholars have reflected critically on the latter, they 
continue to deploy the former to describe the ‘Arab Spring’ without acknowledging its normative 
weight (see Saideman, 2012: 714n2, 719).16
Fluid and flux
Even at their most abstract, fluvial metaphors indicate surprise and intimate menace in an open future. 
Owing to unprecedented transformations, the Middle East has never ‘appeared more politically fluid 
and uncertain’, which is to say its ordering principles have been severely destabilized (Cook and 
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Stathis, 2012: 184). Beyond acknowledging novel change (as in Sawani, 2012: 383), ‘fluid’ further 
signals spontaneity and irrationality (Weyland, 2012: 920, 924), unpredictability (Joshi, 2011: 63), an 
opening for unwelcome actors (see Kamrava, 2012: 102) and direct peril (Adib-Moghhaddam, 2012: 
23; Kamrava, 2012: 99). ‘Flux’ is similarly pitched, announcing not only a dynamic situation but also 
little hope for predictable early outcomes (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 2012: 840), much less long-
term goals like fully functioning democracy or regional stability and security.
Through their references to waves and more abstract fluvial descriptors, ‘Arab Spring’ scholars 
readily evoke the frightening dynamism passed down from flood myths. Combined with invoca-
tions of the problem of time, fluvial metaphors implicitly affirm the idea that surprising and uncer-
tain events render knowledge and politics insecure. They also suggest that as our sense of timing 
in the region has faltered (i.e. as extant modes of intellectually synthesizing MENA politics have 
faltered), our sense of the region’s security has gone with it.
Emancipated minors
As timing becomes more challenging, symbolic temporal references become more negative, cast-
ing time itself as intrinsically treacherous. Such a situation calls for attempts at redressing our 
sense of timing and thereby our sense of security by proposing how events can be either retrofitted 
to prior models, used to revise them, or taken as an opportunity for new thinking. Recall that these 
options map onto spectra of increasingly active and difficult timing (see outlined earlier), including 
the possibility of a complete breakdown in our comprehension of events. These spectra highlight 
an intrinsic conservatism: retrofitting and minimal revisions are preferable to genuine alternatives 
because they require less conceptual work and because they remain some distance from the spectre 
of a timing failure. Insofar as such a failure engenders a sense of catastrophe, in/security can be 
understood as an emotional facet of timing. Recalling Daase and Kessler’s (2007: 419–427) typol-
ogy of danger, a key security benefit of timing is to move unknown unknowns away from the 
unnerving void of comprehension toward less frightful realms of risky but known unknowns or 
threatening but tangibly familiar known knowns, both of which admit to some integration and 
coordination and thus delimit future possibilities. Or, in Dillon’s (2008: 313) eschatological formu-
lation, we might say that to secure human beings we must ‘tame the future’ by timing it.
This section demonstrates that numerous ‘Arab Spring’ responses opted for the most conserva-
tive option of retrofitting events to extant understandings of liberal democratization. Confronting 
an uncertain, dynamic and seemingly fraught situation, they quickly reinscribed the novel present 
and open future of the ‘Arab Spring’ in an intelligible, democratic trajectory through temporal 
Othering, the practice of linking currently strange phenomena to earlier, more familiar periods of 
a known history culminating in a secure endpoint. The primary benefit of temporal Othering is to 
render contemporary difference homogeneous and thus more amenable to comprehension and 
intervention. Although Othering has been a longstanding concern in international relations, its 
temporal aspects have only recently come into view (see Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). Brent 
Steele and I elsewhere identify four moves producing a temporal Other: cleaving time into a pre-
sent distinct from the past, composing a unified history of humanity, differentiating Self and Other 
along that trajectory, and indexing sociopolitical development to biological maturation (Hom and 
Steele, forthcoming).17 I take these in pairs.
Cleaving time, unifying history
Cleaving time severs the past from the present by establishing some break-point in a chronology 
and treating its ‘before’ and ‘after’ as qualitatively distinct. Once normative valuations attach to 
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this cleavage, we can posit a linear-progressive vision in which time is flowing further away from 
the subordinate past and ever closer to a superior future. If this future is treated as a universal 
endpoint, we have a unilinear-progressive vision posing a single criterion for comparing diverse 
cultures, confirming the present Self’s superiority, and indicating how and when any other society 
should ‘necessarily and appropriately go’ (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2010: 38).
‘Arab Spring’ scholars cleave time quite readily. The ‘Arab world lies at the cusp of a new era’ 
(Malik and Awadallah, 2013: 309), ‘there is no going back’ (Haseeb, 2011: 121), a ‘paradigmatic 
shift’ is underway toward an era of ‘postmodern revolutions’ (i.e. struggles for modern values like 
‘freedom, dignity, and individualism’ using new media and ‘narrativity’; see Sabry, 2012: 81, 83), 
a ‘new Arab dawn’ is rising (Sakbani, 2011: 144), or we are witnessing the ‘birth of a new 
Arabism’ (Sawani, 2012: 388). Once welded to the idea that Arab polities are moving toward 
positive goals, such comments inscribe diverse occurrences within a unilinear-progressive trajec-
tory. This can be nebulous: ‘What is occurring illustrates the universal desire for dignity and for 
political participation’ (Cook and Stathis, 2012: 184), marks steps in ‘Freedom’s March’ (Magen, 
2012: 10), or reveals ‘ideas and practices … at the heart of liberalism’ as if the revolts were ‘prem-
ised on a deep, direct and intuitive knowledge of major currents of modern political philosophy’ 
(Bamyeh, 2012: 33). It can also be more formalized: the revolts were a ‘tidal wave’ rushing 
toward ‘democracy according to its primary concepts’ (Haseeb, 2011: 113–114) or a ‘post-
ideological’ move toward a ‘universal’ democratic endpoint (Adib-Moghhaddam, 2012: 23–24). 
Thus the ‘Arab Spring of 2011’ becomes the ‘Arab democratic summer of 2012’ (Owen, 2012: 
380, emphasis added). Such claims entail a scientific search for historical comparisons. Which 
democratic revolution is best for indexing the ‘Arab Spring’: ‘1789, 1848, 1968 or/and 1989’ 
(Kneissl, 2011: 1; see variously Miller et al., 2012; Weyland, 2012), Latin America (Zgurić, 2012: 
418) or Tiananmen Square (Joshi, 2011: 62–63)?
Some sceptics question democratic gains without scrutinizing democratization itself. Although 
the ‘future is yet uncertain about how this great democratic experiment will play itself out’ (Cook 
and Stathis, 2012: 185; see also Chaney, 2012: 363, 391; Mansfield and Snyder, 2012: 725–732), 
the question is not if but how the revolts fit in the democratic saga, or ‘which paths [‘Arab Spring’] 
democratization … will follow’ (Zgurić, 2012: 419, emphasis added). Or, as one agenda-setting 
piece concludes, although the ‘Arab Spring’ poses a ‘severe test’ for the ‘democratization paradigm 
… it is clear that the end product of the MENA peoples’ demands will be a more accountable political 
system’ (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 135). Even though such questions do not completely determine 
the ‘Arab Spring’ future, they have already moved it from uncharted and dangerous waters into the 
familiar slipstream of Western political progress toward stability and security. For those more san-
guine, the revolts are already a political success story: they mark ‘the completion of the 1989 revo-
lutions’ (Kaldor, 2011) or a ‘peaceful, civilized and non-ideological’ process whose sole aim is to 
‘free man and better his conditions’ in service of his ‘joint destiny’ in ‘salvation’ qua ‘democracy 
in the Arab World’ (Sakbani, 2011: 144–145). Proponents of this singular endpoint find no ideological 
taint in ‘liberal democracy’, ‘civilization’ or ‘modernity’; these outcomes are simply characteristic 
of what happens everywhere eventually.
In these ways, the idea of liberal democracy facilitates the synthesis of novel, unique and par-
ticular changes in a more intelligible account with a known endpoint. It reassures us that even if the 
Arab world is changing in surprising ways, it is at least becoming more like previous iterations of 
political transformation which provide a more secure vision of what will ultimately happen and 
how and when we can do something about it. Put differently, this way of thinking uses the change 
continuum of liberal democratization as a standard for timing the ‘Arab Spring’ in a way that 
re-secures it.
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Times of the Self and Other, and a human development metaphor
By synthesizing contemporary changes within a unilinear-progressive trajectory, democratization 
denies incommensurable differences – there is only one arc that humanity follows toward a com-
mon endpoint. This arc can, however, be subdivided into a ‘set of developmental sequences’ locat-
ing contemporary Others behind the present Self (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 98), which is 
affirmed as a ‘chronocratic elite’ (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2010: 46). Furthermore, Others become 
examples of a ‘temporally prior Self’ (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 56–58). This renders contem-
porary strangeness more intelligible and manageable by moving it ‘backward’ along a singular 
trajectory secured by familiar logics within known parameters.
The metaphor of human development complements temporal Othering. We know human chil-
dren will mature into adults, as identified by certain characteristics (e.g. body hair, lower voice). 
This allows an elite Self to compare Others with its own history and assess how developed or 
‘mature’ they are by common characteristics. It has an air of inclusivity (all children possess 
natural developmental potential), but for Others the price of inclusion is a retrograde position in 
a foreign history. This return to the womb also makes Others eligible for discipline – because 
children can mature, they should ‘grow up’ (Hom and Steele, forthcoming).
Such interpretations pepper ‘Arab Spring’ scholarship, as seen in references to the region’s lag 
in political progress, equations of political maturity with liberal democracy, and developmental 
prescriptions for the Arab world’s ‘emancipated minors’. As the ‘fourth wave’ of democratization, 
the ‘Arab Spring’ is also the ‘belated arrival of democracy’ (Magen, 2012: 10) in a place hitherto 
‘left behind’ (Joshi, 2011: 64), which had ‘somehow missed its rendezvous with modernity’ (Pace 
and Cavatorta, 2012: 130). Or the revolts redress a ‘democratic deficit’ (Chaney, 2012: 365) and 
prove that – finally – a good idea’s ‘time has come’ (Kneissl, 2011: 1–2). So go remarks about the 
‘fledgling’ status of ‘Arab Spring’ states (Kamrava, 2012: 99; Miller et al., 2012: xvi), for only on 
a known and shared trajectory can we determine that revolts signal ‘an arrival at maturity’ (Sawani, 
2012: 388; Adib-Moghhaddam, 2012: 24) or that missteps signal persistent immaturity (Joshi, 
2011: 65). Both assessments equate political maturity with institutionalized democracy (see Miller 
et al., 2012: 224) and thereby synthesize multiple experiences into a singular continuum prescrib-
ing when specific changes can and should take place in order to reach a common endpoint.
Why have ‘Arab Spring’ polities straggled toward adulthood? Perhaps because of particular 
groups’ political immaturity and inexperience (Miller et al., 2012: 298). Or because it is simply 
too soon to expect sophistication from ‘instant states’ (Magen, 2012: 17) or ‘inchoate’ (i.e. non-
institutionalized; see Weyland, 2012: 922–223) polities. The problem is that though they have 
exited the ‘womb of revolution’ (Mabrouk, 2011: 144), protestors still do not realize (as academic 
experts do) how lengthy and difficult is their remaining development, so they may try to run 
before they can walk.18
In addition to bringing Arab publics within a Western ambit, temporal Othering also moves 
novel phenomena onto more familiar terrain, where risk or threat pose tractable security challenges 
in place of unintelligible danger. Once surprising changes become democratic developments, they 
no longer pose the spectre of catastrophe linked to unknown unknowns. Instead, ‘“immature” or 
“illiberal” democracies are at increased risk of conflict’ (Miller et al., 2012: 253) or ‘botched 
democratizations … could give rise to grave threats to international peace and security’ (Sorenson, 
2011: 41). Compared to unmitigated incomprehensibility, conflict risks and security threats are 
understandable and actionable. International conflict is a particular type of danger linked to indica-
tors like economic development, freedom scores and good governance criteria (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 2012: 727–728; see Tagma et al., 2013: 386) and addressed by a range of options, including 
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stability enforcement. Similarly, international security is a particular sort of value linked to stra-
tegic and theoretical traditions like realism, which offers interpretive and policy recourses about 
transforming ‘Arab Spring’ countries even as they remain in their ‘birth pangs’ (Walt, 2011a).
According to this way of thinking, scholars can promote security and stability by offering didac-
tic assistance to immature but promising ‘Arab Spring’ groups. The USA ‘must encourage and rein 
in various constituencies and institutions’ across the region (Anderson, 2011: 7; see also Kaldor, 
2011). Or policymakers should distinguish between durably autocratic states, developmentally 
‘hopeless’ ones and those ‘worth putting resources into’ – otherwise, ‘full-fledged democracy, if it 
is attained, will be premature and likely stillborn’ (Wiarda, 2012: 137; see also Joshi, 2011: 61). 
Worthwhile states will need to be shown how the ‘preliminary’ stage of ‘expanding literacy, sup-
porting economic development, enhancing civil society, and building institutions’ must be fol-
lowed by an ‘intermediary’ stage of ‘economic development, a growing middle class, an educated 
population, [and] civil society’ to eventually produce liberal-democratic adulthood (Wiarda, 2012: 
137). Or they must develop a ‘notion of citizenship combined with a well-protected human rights 
regime’ (Owen, 2012: 380). Or ‘full-fledged democracy’ depends ‘first and foremost’ on ‘estab-
lishing security’ (Cook and Stathis, 2012: 182). In any case, the ‘Arab Spring’ calls for good men-
toring: demonstrators will need to be ‘taught’ parliamentary politics (Lynch, 2013: 122) so as to 
turn a ‘youthful transition’ into a ‘productive’ one (Malik and Awadallah, 2013: 309).19 This pre-
sumption overwhelms any novelty in the revolts: even if they ‘call for a total rethinking of western 
security, foreign, and economic policies’, the consequence is that ‘western countries and institu-
tions should consult the people of the Middle East about how they can help’ re/construct the MENA 
region along Western political lines (Kaldor, 2011, emphasis added). By rising up against tyranny, 
the emancipated minors of the ‘Arab Spring’ have shown potential; now if they will just heed adult 
advice. This didactic framework includes a clear normative element. Precisely because other, less 
progressive states are watching, and while democracy is ‘in such a fledgling state in the Arab 
world, those countries attempting to practice it have the great responsibility of demonstrating how 
to do so well’ (Owen, 2012: 381, emphasis added).
Some scholars disagree, claiming that Arab states have not yet demonstrated democratic bona 
fides. Therefore, Western states should choose a ‘policy of “benevolent neglect”’ or simply get out 
(Walt, 2011c). However, this dispute falls between two possibilities: either ‘Arab Spring’ states are 
intelligible by the common standard of liberal-democratic maturation, eligible for assistance, and 
representative of a known threat to security and stability owing to their all-too-recent ‘birth’; or 
they are an unknown unknown incommensurable with extant indices of political progress and 
should be given a wide berth by all who would avoid catastrophe (as in Wiarda, 2012: 137). While 
nearly diametric, both conclusions flow from temporal Othering’s presumptive links among secu-
rity, democracy, progress, and intelligibility, on the one hand, and unmitigated danger, chaos, 
regress, and the unknown, on the other. They also highlight its timing function: the former conclu-
sion moves forward by retrofitting novel events to an extant timing standard; the latter confronts a 
categorical timing failure, infers disaster and decamps altogether.
Conclusion: The vagaries of timing political change
In the academic aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’, time figures as a malevolent force. Similarly, flu-
vial metaphors qualify political transformations as dynamic and dangerous. Finally, temporal 
Othering situates Arab polities as backwards, mostly helpless and occasionally hopeless, but 
always rehearsing the democratic experience. These symbolic references to time trace an arc from 
surprise through anxiety to the active synthesis of present and future possibilities according to a 
particular standard, with the first two announcing a timing problem and the third providing the 
 at Glasgow University Library on January 27, 2016sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Hom 13
solution. Thinking through timing in this way gathers the otherwise disparate rhetorical tropes of 
the ‘Arab Spring’ in a synoptic explanation that deepens our understanding of the connections 
among international politics, change, and time. Prior to 2011, the MENA region was capably situ-
ated in theoretical models that did not anticipate sudden and important changes.20 Widespread 
revolts threw off this sense of timing, engendering temporalized expressions of anxiety and efforts 
to move the revolts from a void of incomprehensibility to the more tractable terrain of democratiza-
tion, replete with threats, risks and avenues to intervention.
This arc also shows how timing is important to security. Inasmuch as they signal ‘metathreats’ 
(Burgess, 2012: 711–712) such as uncertainty, instability, and the sheer unknown, negative tempo-
ral tropes designate a security issue, while less malign tropes signal some modicum of order and 
security achieved through successful timing. Indeed, timing is a securing move in its own right: a 
phenomenon seems more or less secure depending on our sense of timing – more so when it is 
timed successfully and, especially, passively; less so when timing requires active effort, falters, or 
confronts failure.
‘Arab Spring’ scholars occasionally corroborate timing’s import by admitting surprise at the 
‘speed, scope and intensity’ of events (Walt, 2011a) compared with expectations of ‘a slower, gen-
erational transformation’ (Lynch, 2013: 5). Others emphasize the different paces of protests and 
institutional change (Mansfield and Snyder, 2012: 727). Sceptics also mention the importance 
attached by neoliberal actors to the ‘sequencing of actions … expected to set the political pace’ 
(Tagma et al., 2013: 386). Closest of all, confounded expectations cause some to question ‘the tim-
ing of the “Spring”’ (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 129). Yet these observations have not generated 
further reflection on timing per se. Similarly, our three temporal tropes pass without comment or 
critique in other ‘Arab Spring’ treatments. Given the centrality of timing practices to negotiating 
novel change and the important work temporal tropes perform in ‘Arab Spring’ analyses, this blind 
spot is somewhat surprising. It also holds important implications for scholarly reflexivity.
First, treating temporal references as timing indexicals highlights an attribution error in ‘Arab 
Spring’ scholarship. Rather than quickly assessing MENA publics as immature or passive prior to 
2011, we should first ask whether extant theory was adequate to the region’s dynamics. Inasmuch 
as changes never emerge ex nihilo (an implicit assumption of any research making causal, idea-
tional or historical claims), it is spurious to appraise transforming publics as formerly passive but 
now active or growing up (relatedly, see Della Porta, 2013). Rather, collective surprise indicates 
that it was scholars who were ‘behind the times’ because their timing modes were too passive and 
thus thrown off by the transformative capacity of Arab peoples. Challenging this imputation of 
abrupt initiative also undermines the connection between ‘Arab Spring’ dynamism and intrinsic 
danger, which relies on the contrast between stable bulwarks of order and security and the eruptive 
imagery of fluvial metaphors.
Second, the ‘Arab Spring’ illustrates a conservative tension in scholarly timing practices. 
Democratization provided theoretical traction in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ and thereby 
took the anxious edge off the present and future. It did so without requiring substantial revisions or 
wholesale conceptual change, the latter of which might have vitiated our sense of timing alto-
gether. But, while democratization offers immediate benefits by quelling anxiety and connecting 
uncertain developments to more secure outcomes, retrofitting the ‘Arab Spring’ to liberal democ-
racy also delimits further possibilities by predetermining the political terms and stakes of an 
ambiguous, unfolding situation.
As shown earlier, this conservatism crosses a wide range of responses. It is unsurprising to find 
mainstream security, foreign policy and social scientific work deploying a democratic timing 
standard to replace fluid ‘times’ with stable, predictable, security proposals.21 However, liberal-
democratic timing also prevails in less orthodox scholarship. The problem of time and fluvial 
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metaphors resound in critiques of old understandings of the Arab world (Sawani, 2012: 392), as 
well as postmodern and anarchist philosophical responses (Adib-Moghhaddam, 2012: 23; 
Bamyeh, 2012: 37). So do variations on temporal Othering (Sawani, 2012: 388; Adib-
Moghhaddam, 2012: 23–24; Bamyeh, 2012: 33, see earlier). Even an argument that the ‘Arab 
Spring’ represents an ‘aporia of time’ (Sabry, 2012: 84), which would seem close to my own, 
persists with liberal-democratic timing: the ‘Arab Spring’ calls for new thinking, yet it is also 
(already) a struggle for the Western values of ‘freedom, dignity, and individualism’ (Sabry, 2012: 
81–84). Even if we must ‘stammer in a new language’ owing to momentous changes, a liberal-
democratic standard helps interpret and valorize seemingly incomprehensible events – ‘the 
subaltern: a mother waving her dead child’s body with extraordinary courage and dignity; young 
women and men marching, their chests inviting bullets, their dignity worth dying for’ (Sabry, 
2012: 81, emphasis in original). Such responses diverge from mainstream scholarship in many 
ways but not in terms of their timing standards.
Third, the connections between ‘time’ utterances and timing practices suggest that theoretical 
conservatism also results from the ordinary language with which scholars appraise change, which in 
turn implicates the wider ‘Arab Spring’ scholarship. Even if not emphasizing security concerns or 
concluding with temporal Othering, evocations of the problem of time and flood myths help prefig-
ure the revolutions as problems requiring a timing solution that clarifies and perhaps resolves their 
security ramifications.22 Describing the revolts as ‘waves’, ‘uprisings’ or ‘in flux’ exerts a normative 
bias against indeterminate, laissez faire, or ‘wait and see’ conclusions. In our rhetorical common 
sense, these tropes oblige a decisive response restoring our sense of timing and capacity for action. 
Furthermore, as matters of common sense they comprise a deracinated vernacular, seemingly ano-
dyne terms that obscure their own productive and constrictive influence on our theoretical imagina-
tion. In cases like the ‘Arab Spring’, they discourage scholars from taking surprising events on their 
own terms – as unique developments broaching entirely different ways of engaging political trans-
formation – and encourage us to relate to them as instantiating times of insecurity.23
Three alternative temporal responses
Given the prevalence and power of these three tropes to discipline responses to the ‘Arab Spring’, 
what is to be done? Are we simply resigned to a trite, Western democratic timing standard and the 
security politics it engenders, or are there other ways to proceed? To close, I want to briefly pro-
pose three alternative temporalities that work toward the possibility of negotiating novel change 
differently. The first two correspond to the remaining columns of the table earlier, while the third 
departs from that range of options altogether.
First, we can use the ‘Arab Spring’ to critically revise extant theories. Rather than small tweaks 
to liberal-democratic mechanisms,24 this involves inverting the logic of temporal Othering by hold-
ing up the ‘Arab Spring’ as a sceptical rather than a congratulatory mirror on liberal democracy.25 
For example, it might show how the ‘Arab Street’ was produced by the policies of the same neo-
liberal institutions now worrying about the Arab Street’s ‘radical pluralism’ (Tagma et al., 2013). 
Or it might temper democracy promotion in the region so that a locally constructed and potentially 
distinct form of ‘democratic solidarity’ might emerge (Banai, 2013). These arguments refute tem-
poral Othering’s implicit assertion that ‘our’ present is so successful as to encompass all the hopes 
of others’ future possibilities. Or it might challenge ‘negative Western’ assessments by exposing 
democracy’s messy iterations in North America and Europe as ‘wounds’ later ‘dressed’ in heroic 
and teleological origin stories (Sadiki, 2012; Blaney and Inayatullah, 2010: 35). Finally, it high-
lights related wounds in modern security logics, which elevate uncertainty and surprise to existen-
tial dangers requiring Western oversight and intervention. In these ways, critical revision subjects 
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dominant timing modes to intense scrutiny in hopes of reducing further theoretical and policy 
overreaches.
Second, we can engage the ‘Arab Spring’ as an opportunity to develop entirely new timing 
standards. Here we consider the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts as events sui generis and explore what dif-
ferent theories, practices and policies they enable. This alternative connects to more thoroughgoing 
critical appraisals, such as those showing how the protests’ sexual politics refuse imperialist logics 
(Agathangelou, 2011) or attempting a resolutely ‘African reading’ of the revolts (Grovogui, 2013). 
It is likely to be challenging in two respects. First, by jettisoning known timing standards, whole-
sale reconstruction involves maximal effort. Second, because our common-sense rhetoric impli-
cates established timing modes, it also calls ordinary language into question. In order to develop 
genuinely new ideas about novel change that resist extant security logics, we may need to first 
establish different ways of speaking and thinking altogether.
Third, we could explicitly refuse to draw conclusions about events still unfolding in ‘real time’. 
This involves much more than genuflections to prudence authorizing self-assured prognostica-
tions.26 It is also most difficult because it contravenes prevailing habits of scholarship. International 
politics scholars are professionally and institutionally conditioned to understand situations in order 
to improve them (Levine, 2012: 1–13). Cases of novel change – which tend to provoke our exis-
tential desire to inhabit a manageable, secure world where we can successfully time important 
processes – only exacerbate this situation (see Hom, 2013: 27–64). Yet, while such efforts enable 
some action, this has no necessary link to improvement, or to security for that matter. If our voca-
tional commitment is to understanding and bettering international affairs, we should also consider 
active withholding, when scholars not only refuse to render assured interpretations of unfolding 
events, but also vigorously interrogate such responses.
This may seem like doing nothing just when something must be done.27 However, active with-
holding is important for scholarly timing because it resists quick and dirty explanations that 
reinforce tired policies. It also serves a ‘constellar’ function in scholarly dialogue (Levine, 2012: 
225–239), tempering conclusions and balancing various proposals to create room for dissent and 
genuine alternatives. Active withholding entails understated timing standards, authorizing only 
what is minimally necessary to go on without precluding other options. It thereby constructs a 
deliberately open time (see Hom and Steele, 2010: 278–292), refusing both overly sure and exces-
sively anxious conclusions, which both end up reinforcing extant knowledge and modern security 
logics associated with Western intervention.
At most, active withholding allows actual participants in transformative change to set the terms 
of politics free from assertive and strident external judgements about their present meaning, future 
consequences, and security repercussions. At the very least, it resists the urge to glibly restore a 
sense of timing – and through timing the veneer of security – through the use of commonplace 
standards like liberal democracy, which ‘rescues’ the newly emancipated minors of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ from deep, dark waters only to strand them on the allegedly stable, secure future of some-
one else’s present. Instead, the open time of active withholding acknowledges our most basic 
vocational requirement: it is precisely in uncertain, fluid situations of surprising change that schol-
ars most need a flexible, unfettered time to think. Until we actively restore that sense of timing, our 
theories are liable to remain passive, inadequate and behind the times of revolutionary changes.
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Notes
 1. Among numerous examples, see Goodwin (2011: 452) and Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 125).
 2. This ensures the material constitutes an academic artefact insofar as (1) thoughts expressed by institu-
tionally affiliated scholars in non-academic outlets are similar to their arguments in academic venues, 
and (2) non-affiliated writers appearing in academic publications inform academic discourse.
 3. The conclusion draws specific connections with ‘Arab Spring’ scholarship.
 4. For example, these literatures usually assume democracy as the endpoint of the ‘Arab Spring’. How 
remote temporal references might authorize the timing practices explicated here is discussed elsewhere 
in this article.
 5. For a related discussion of time in security studies, see McIntosh (2015).
 6. Although variations on the problem of time appear unexplicated in Walker and Hutchings.
 7. Although Elias does not appear in much critical international relations scholarship (although see 
Linklater, 2011), An Essay on Time does not preclude critical development. Indeed, timing is well-suited 
to critical scholarship by virtue of its process-relational, intersubjective and dynamic inclinations.
 8. Focusing on timing rather than time/temporality might seem a minor distinction, and undoubtedly dis-
cussions of the latter concern the former. However, international relations has not yet drawn this out 
explicitly, deploying ‘timing’ mostly incidentally or as generic temporal reference. By contrast, Elias 
explicitly positions time/temporality as derived from timing.
 9. Because of its reliability and adaptability, the standardized clock provides a timing standard par 
excellence.
10. On this reading, chronos and kairos are less dichotomous ‘times’ than references to alternative ways of 
timing: chronos is institutionalized and general, kairos is idiosyncratic.
11. Butler and Khoury (2013) transcribe a 2012 roundtable.
12. See Tagma et al. (2013: 387–389).
13. As, for example, in the 1978 film Jaws II.
14. ‘Insurgent’ comes from the Latin insurgěre, ‘to rise up’; see ‘insurgent’ in OED Online; available at: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97280?redirectedFrom=insurgent (accessed 18 May 2015).
15. Relatedly, genteel thinkers welcome ‘Egyptians forming an orderly queue’ instead of inundating Tahrir 
Square as an indication of civil society’s stabilizing influence (Kaldor, 2011).
16. Likewise, a special issue introduction sensitive to ‘Orientalist’ connotations nevertheless instructs 
authors to interchange ‘spring’ with ‘uprising’ because of the ‘difficulty in pinning the phenomenon 
down with significant precision due to uncertain political outcomes’ (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 136n1).
17. We do not, however, relate temporal Othering to the framework developed here.
18. Similar remarks welcome the Arab ‘awakening’ (Joshi, 2011: 65; Kneissl, 2011: 1; Lynch, 2013: 30; 
Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 135; Sakbani, 2011: 127–128), although this might also arouse a ‘slumbering’ 
umma (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi, 2012: 834).
19. Only Lynch (2013: 127) questions the metaphor’s appropriateness.
20. The region was presumed either autocratically stable (Gause, 2011) or facing a gradual transition toward 
representative politics (see Pace and Cavatorta, 2012).
21. Although democracy scholars claiming sensitivity to ‘utopian … simplifications’ remain conspicuously 
insensitive to the utopian simplicity of democratic timing (Joshi, 2011: 61–65).
22. For example, see Korany (2013: 77), Kuhn (2012: 674–677), Della Porta (2012), Santini and Hassan 
(2012: 71–73) and Yom and Gause (2012).
23. Consequently, even if temporal tropes recede in subsequent discussions (as noted in the Introduction 
earlier), they may exert lasting influence through such prefiguration.
24. For example, they may be non-linear (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012: 135) or ‘take time’ (Cook and Stathis, 
2012: 182). Similarly, revision is distinct from explanatory-theoretical reshuffling – for example, calls to 
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elevate social movements and contentious politics ‘on the ground’ over elites (Korany, 2013; Della Porta, 
2013), which runs the risk of substituting one retrofit for another.
25. On the use of ‘dialogic mirrors’, see Hom and Steele (forthcoming).
26. For example, Sabry’s comments earlier, or Walt (2011a), who recommends humility about ‘our ability to 
forecast where things are headed’ before propounding a ‘realist policy’ for Egypt.
27. Similarly, ‘wait and see’ may not seem feasible for experts on international affairs, but this only 
reinforces my point by highlighting an institutional-structural incentive for conservative timing.
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